Payment systems, inside money and financial intermediation by Merrouche, Ouarda & Nier, Erlend
Policy Research Working Paper 5445
























































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5445
This paper assesses the impact of introducing an efficient 
payment system on the amount of credit provided by 
the banking system. Two channels are investigated. 
First, innovations in wholesale payments technology 
enhance the security and speed of deposits as a payment 
medium for customers and therefore affect the split 
between holdings of cash and the holdings of deposits 
that can be intermediated by the banking system. 
Second, innovations in wholesale payments technology 
help establish well-functioning interbank markets for 
end-of-day funds, which reduces the need for banks to 
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hold excess reserves. The authors examine these links 
empirically using payment system reforms in Eastern 
European countries as a laboratory. The analysis finds 
evidence that reforms led to a shift away from cash in 
favor of demand deposits and that this in turn enabled a 
prolonged credit expansion in the sample countries. By 
contrast, while payment system innovations also led to a 
reduction in excess reserves in some countries, this effect 
was not causal for the credit boom observed in these 
countries. Payment Systems, Inside Money and Financial Intermediation
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Keywords: Payment systems, money demand, credit supply. “We’d always thought that if you wanted to cripple the US economy, you’d take out the
payment systems. Banks would be forced to fall back on ine¢cient physical transfers of
money. Businesses would resort to barter and IOUs; the level of economic activity across
the country could drop like a rock.”
Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve
System, 1987-2006
1 Introduction
Payment systems1 are the means by which inside money is transferred between banks.2
Reforms to improve the e¢ciency of these systems have the potential to improve welfare
by increasing the demand for inside money and reducing the need for outside money.
The reason is that banks use inside money (deposits) to …nance lending to the corporate
sector and households. An economy which increases its reliance on inside money relative
to outside money may therefore be able to support a higher level of capital and increased
growth as that capital is accumulated. Indeed, the extant literature has found a robust
relationship between …nancial depth, as measured by the amount of credit extended by
the banking system and the subsequent rate of growth of the economy as a whole.3
Historically, banks have played a central role both in facilitating payments and in the
creation of credit. But most theories of banking ignore the interplay between the two.
These theories emphasize frictions such as asymmetric information on borrowers and in-
complete markets more generally as important in understanding intermediation. In an
in‡uential study, Diamond (1984) argued that intermediaries overcome asymmetric in-
formation problems by acting as "delegated monitors". Another strand of the literature,
starting with Diamond and Dybvig (1983) emphasizes the role of banks in insuring liquid-
ity needs of customers while at the same time investing in longer-term assets. However in
this model and much of the subsequent literature, both a bank’s assets and liabilities are
real and there is no separate role for outside money. Only very recently have economists
started to provide theories of intermediation where monetary disturbances (shifts in the
demand for outside versus inside money) can a¤ect the amount of credit provided by the
banking system, e.g. Diamond and Rajan (2006).
1The term payment system refers to the instruments, organizations, operating procedures, and in-
formation and communication systems used to initiate and transmit payment information from payer
to payee and to settle payments (BIS (2001), Core Principles for Systematically Important Payment
Systems, Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, January).
2In this process the transfer of inside money (deposits) is settled through exchanges of outside money
i.e. the ultimate settlement asset, usually central bank balances.
3See King and Levine (1993) for an early contribution to this literature. In this paper we examine in
more detail the determinants of …nancial depth, taking its potential to contribute to economic growth as
given.
2On the other hand, a large body of empirical literature provides evidence linking mon-
etary disturbances to business cycles. It is usually found that this link is stronger for the
inside component of the money supply than it is for outside money. In their analysis of
the Great Depression, Christiano et al (2004) argue that the contraction phase was pri-
marily the consequence of a shock that induced a shift away from privately intermediated
liabilities, such as bank deposits, and towards currency. This shock drove households to
accumulate currency at the expense of demand deposits that could be used to fund entre-
preneurs who own and operate the economy’s stock of capital. In the same vein, Rocko¤
(1993) provides evidence that the Great Depression was the consequence of a drastic de-
terioration in the acceptance of bank money as payment medium. At the time, it was
a chain of bank failures that caused the payment system to collapse. It is thought that
con…dence in bank money was restored only by structural reforms to address …nancial
risk in the banking system, such as the introduction of federal deposit insurance.
Finally, our paper is related to a small literature that has documented links between de-
posit taking and lending. There is evidence to suggest that information obtained through
monitoring the cash ‡ow in and out of demand deposits can be used by banks to help
make credit decisions (Mester, Nakamura and Renault (2007)). Moreover, Berlin and
Mester (1999) show that banks that are …nanced by core (transaction) deposits are able
to insulate borrowers from changes in aggregate borrowing costs, because what banks
pay on core deposits is relatively insensitive to economy-wide ‡uctuations in the cost of
credit. Finally, the literature documents synergies between deposit taking and loan com-
mitments, and hence lending more generally (Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002)). When
withdrawals of deposits are imperfectly correlated with drawdowns on commitments, both
can be o¤ered more cheaply, drawing on a common pool of liquid assets held by the bank.
These papers stop short of drawing out the role an e¢cient interbank payment system
might play with regard to these mechanisms. But arguably, the e¢ciency of interbank
payment systems may a¤ect both a) banks’ ability to o¤er transactions services to cus-
tomers; and b) their ability to pool liquidity across banks. A greater e¢ciency of inter-
bank payment systems is thus likely to a¤ect credit creation. In this paper we investigate
whether or not payment system reform and credit creation are linked. We also study the
transmission channels that might e¤ect such a link.
As summarized in Figure 1 two channels are investigated. Innovations in wholesale
payments technology enhance the reliability of inside money as a payment medium for
customers and therefore a¤ect the split between holdings of cash (outside money) and
holdings of deposits (inside money). While cash is held by households and does not
(perhaps for lack of monitoring skills) get lent out to private sector borrowers, deposits
are intermediated by the banking system. An increase in the supply of deposits to the
banking system can therefore in turn lead to a shift in the supply of credit to the economy
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Figure 1: Transmission Mechanisms
(deposit channel). Second, innovations in wholesale payment systems help establish well-
functioning interbank markets for end-of-day funds. This may reduce the need for banks
to hold excess reserves (outside money) to self-ensure against end-of-day out‡ows and
thus helps credit creation (reserves channel).
It is important to emphasize, however, that neither the deposit nor the reserves channel
needs to hold by virtue of a balance sheet identity (see equation 1).
 +  +  =  +  +  (1)
For example, even if the payments reform leads to an increase in deposits () at the
expense of cash, this may result in an increase in reserves (), or other liquid assets (),
leaving unchanged the level of loans () to the non-…nancial sector. The extent to which
an increase in deposits results in an increase in loans is therefore an empirical question
which needs to be examined carefully.
Likewise, even if reform leads to a reduction in reserves (), this can be matched by a
reduction in the total amount of interbank deposits (), or an increase in other liquid
assets (), rather than an increase in loans to the non-…nancial sector () 4. Whether
or not a reduction in reserves has an e¤ect on loans supplied by the banking system is
therefore again a question that needs to be addressed empirically.
To examine whether payment system developments help credit creation and which,
if any mechanism underpins this e¤ect, we use as our laboratory a sample of transition
4Moreover, as emphasized by Disyatat (2008), central banks will in practice tend to accommodate
‡uctuations in desired reserves, e.g. by reducing the amount of securities taken on repo in open market
operations (reducing reserve repos ), in order to prevent such ‡uctuations to have an e¤ect on interest
rates.
4economies over the period 1995-2005. All of our sample countries were part of the Eastern
European bloc and all have recently joined the European Union. These countries are at a
similar level of economic and …nancial development: all sample economies have bank-based
…nancial systems and …nancial markets play only a minor role. Our sample represents a
relatively homogenous group of countries also in other respects, e.g. geographic location
and size.
The empirical analysis exploits the fact that these countries have been implementing
large one-time reforms of their payment systems, in order to expedite the processing of
payments and reduce the risk and uncertainty associated with non-cash payments. That
is, we can observe relatively big changes in payments technology. At the same time the
e¤ects of these changes are unlikely to be obscured by di¤erences in habit or culture as
regards the use of payment systems5. Our sample countries are all moving from a world
where cash is by far the dominant means of payment to one where non-cash payments are
taking hold gradually.
First, we …nd that upon the introduction of e¢cient payment systems there is a marked
increase in the trend growth of credit. This …nding is robust to the inclusion of control
variables that take account of macroeconomic determinants of credit growth, as well as
other dimensions of structural change in our sample, such as variation in foreign ownership
of banking assets. It is robust also to a number of re…nements in our identi…cation strategy
that account for omitted variables and other forms of endogeneity.
Further investigation suggests that the trend increase in credit supplied to the private
sector is associated with a trend decrease in the use of currency (outside money), relative
to demand deposits (inside money), while the evidence in favor of a reduction in banks’
holding of excess reserves (outside money) is much less strong. In structural reform regres-
sions we …nd evidence of a more general and signi…cantly positive relationship between
credit supply shocks and liquidity preference shocks away from cash and towards bank
deposits, while again the relationship between reserves and credit is more tenuous.
Overall, our results suggest that for the countries in our sample, the adoption of
automated interbank payment systems was an important precondition for the credit boom
documented by Cottarelli et al (2003), among others, and that the e¤ect of payments
reform on credit creation has worked through a "deposit channel", rather than a "reserves
channel".
These …ndings serve to illustrate a simple but fundamental point: the banking system’s
function as provider of credit to the economy builds on its capacity to o¤er a reliable
payment medium. This means that reforms to improve the e¢ciency of interbank payment
systems can have a …rst-order e¤ect on the amount of credit provided by the banking
5For example, while in most advanced countries, there has over the past two decades been a gradual
demise of checks, this has taken longer in some countries (eg the United States, France) than in others (eg
Germany), partly as a result of di¤erent preferences for particular payment modes, that are entrenched
in habit or culture.
5system.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the process of
payment systems modernization in accession countries in the context of the broader struc-
tural changes to their banking systems. Section 3 elaborates the main empirical strategy
and discusses reduced-form and di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimates used to identify the ef-
fect of payment reform on credit. Section 4 assesses the relevance of the two transmission
channels. Section 5 provides structural estimates of the relationship between liquidity
preference shocks and credit supply shocks. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Payment Systems and Banking Reforms
3 in Transition Economies
The payment systems of the former Eastern European bloc countries were paper-based
settlement systems subject to long transport and processing delays (Sundararajan and
Sensenbrenner (1994) and Balino, Dhawan, and Sundararadjan (1994)).
From the mid-1990s, in many economies in the region, signi…cant reforms of payment
and settlement systems were introduced as part of the process of …nancial sector reform,
in an e¤ort to improve the speed, reliability and security of payments.
Typically, early reforms relied on readily available technologies to speed up trans-
portation of documents, modify accounting practices, standardize operating procedures,
introduce and improve dedicated courier services and expedite large-value payments by
use of cable and telegraphic networks. In addition, measures were adopted to address
…nancial risk in payment systems, namely (1) exposure limits; (2) collateralization, (3)
loss-sharing arrangements, and (4) shortening of time lags in settlements.
The advanced reforms we focus on in our empirical analysis comprised the introduction
of automated arrangements for interbank transactions that o¤er …nality, a high degree
of security, and immediate, same-day, or value-dated settlement.6 Appendix 1 provides
further details on payment system reforms, country-by-country. Major reforms were dated
using information contained in the ECB Blue Book on payment systems in accession
countries (2002) (available online) as well as national central banks’ annual reports. In
almost all cases, across the sample period there is a single clearly identi…able date of
introduction of a modern automated interbank payment system. In a small number
of countries, multiple systems supporting di¤erent types of interbank transactions were
introduced consecutively over the sample period. In these cases, we focus on the date the
…rst of these systems is introduced.7
6With real time gross settlement (RTGS), payments are settled one by one and in real time – that
is, with virtually no delay. Since payments are not netted out, however, gross settlement systems need
larger amounts of intraday liquidity to facilitate prompt settlement of payments.
7Our results are not a¤ected materially by changes in the dating convention.
6While this paper highlights the e¤ects of payment system reform for our sample coun-
tries, structural changes to the banking system also occurred along other dimensions.
Figure 2 provides evidence that privatization resulted in a reduction of government own-
ership of banking assets in many of the sample countries. Moreover, it shows that the
speed of privatization varies across countries. While the government no longer owned a
sizable fraction of banking system assets at or soon after the start of the sample period
in Estonia, Latvia and Hungary, a gradual process of privatization was still ongoing in
some other countries during our sample period. Figure 2 also documents a rising propor-
tion of banking system assets that are foreign-owned. Finally, countries have undertaken
major reforms to the regulatory and supervisory framework that banks are subject to.
Figure 3 charts the path of a banking system reform index constructed by the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). A higher banking reform index in-
dicates that banking laws, regulations and prudential supervision are closer to the Bank
of International Settlements (BIS) standards.8
In addition to the paths for the share of government ownership, the share of foreign
ownership and banking system reform, Figures 2 and 3 contain a line corresponding to
the date of introduction of a modern interbank payment system. While in principle,
other aspects of structural reforms may represent confounding in‡uences for our analysis,
Figures 2 and 3 suggest that payment system reforms are not contemporaneous with
other structural changes, but that instead there is independent variation in the timing of
payment system reforms – potentially re‡ecting di¤erences in central bank preferences and
resources dedicated to payment system reforms – which can be exploited in the regression
analysis.
8The index takes the following values:
1 Little progress beyond establishment of a two-tier system.
2 Signi…cant liberalisation of interest rates and credit allocation; limited use of directed credit or interest
rate ceilings.
3 Substantial progress in establishment of bank solvency and of a framework for prudential supervi-
sion and regulation; full interest rate liberalisation with little preferential access to cheap re…nancing;
signi…cant lending to private enterprises and signi…cant presence of private banks.
4 Signi…cant movement of banking laws and regulations towards BIS standards; well-functioning bank-
ing competition and e¤ective prudential supervision; and signi…cant term lending to private enterprises;
substantial …nancial deepening.
4+ Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: full convergence of banking
laws and regulations with BIS standards; provision of a full set of competitive banking services.
74 The E¤ect of Payment Systems E¢ciency on Credit
Creation
In this section we develop and apply three di¤erent ways of identifying the e¤ect of
payment systems reforms on credit that exploit both the time series and cross-sectional
variations in payment systems development in our dataset.
4.1 Reduced-Form Evidence: Trend-Break Model
We …rst propose the following reduced-form speci…cation to identify trend changes in the
supply of credit around the transition to modern payment systems:
 = 11 + ¡212 + 13 () + 1 +  + 1 (2)
where  (…nancial intermediation) stands for the credit over GDP ratio in country 
in quarter  The independent variable of interest is the post-reform trend  starting at
one for the …rst post-reform quarter which measures the augmentation in credit growth
from the country-speci…c trend . As  trends upwards over the sample period (for
some countries) we model the e¤ect of payment systems reforms as an acceleration in
credit growth above country-speci…c sample trends.
The regression includes country dummies 1 to control for all time-invariant omitted
variables. Also included are seasonal dummies and year-…xed e¤ects to control for shocks
common to all countries, such as credit accelerations – whatever their cause – that a¤ect
the whole region. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the error terms at the
country level, to allow for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the error term over
time.
¡2 is a vector of observable control variables. The set of controls follows closely the
extant literature on the determinants of …nancial deepening (measured by private credit
over GDP). Speci…cally, it includes those factors that Cottarelli et al (2003) (among
others) emphasize as the main causes of the credit boom in Eastern Europe; namely …scal
consolidations and structural reforms in the banking sector.
The ratio of total government expenditures over GDP is used to capture the potential
for reductions in public spending to crowd-in credit to the private sector. We therefore
expect a negative sign on this variable. We also include the level of activity, namely the
log real per capita GDP and expect, based on prior evidence, e.g. Detragiache, Tressel
and Gupta (2006), this variable to have a positive e¤ect on …nancial depth (private credit
over GDP).
In addition, we control for the e¤ect of in‡ation on credit. Following Boyd, Levine and
Smith (2001) and Cottarelli et al (2003) we allow for this e¤ect to be non-linear, through
inclusion of a high-in‡ation dummy, which takes the value of 1 when in‡ation is above
a threshold (equal to the 75th percentile), and an interaction term of in‡ation with the
8high-in‡ation dummy. Based on existing evidence, we expect in‡ation to have a negative
e¤ect on credit for in‡ation rates above the threshold, while for rates of in‡ation below
the threshold, increases in in‡ation are expected to have no or a small positive e¤ect on
credit.
We also include a number of variables that capture structural changes to the banking
sector. First we include the share of banking assets owned by the government and the
share of banking system assets that are foreign-owned. While it has been suggested that
privatization and a high share of foreign assets might have contributed to a relatively
rapid expansion in credit extended by the banking sector in some transition economies,
Cottarelli et al (2003), neither theory nor more recent existing evidence on the e¤ect of
these variables on …nancial depth is clear-cut. Cross-sectional studies do not typically …nd
a robust correlation between government ownership and credit extended by the banking
system, e.g. Detragiache et al (2006). On the other hand, a recent study on the French
banking reforms in 1985, that involved a retreat by the French Treasury from close control
of the banking system as well as privatization of state-owned banks, …nds that bank credit
contracted in the wake of these reforms, Bertrand, Schoar and Thesmar (2007). Further
tests provided in this study are consistent with the idea that state ownership implies a
soft budget constraint that can give incentives for banks to lend even to unpro…table
businesses.
A large empirical literature on the e¤ects of foreign ownership on credit extended by
the banking sector is surveyed in Detragiache et al (2006). Again this literature has not
reached …rm conclusions. On the one hand foreign ownership leads to an import of human
capital and expertise in screening borrowers. On the other hand, foreign banks may tend
not to take full account of soft (and local) information, resulting in greater rationing of
credit. Detragiache et al (2006) model this trade-o¤. Their model implies that foreign
ownership should be associated with a reduction in credit in poor countries, while on
balance no e¤ect is predicted for high-income countries. In cross-sectional regressions of
bank credit on the share of foreign ownership they …nd evidence that con…rms both of
these predictions. In other words, foreign ownership leads to a reduction in credit for
poor countries, but has no discernible e¤ect for high-income countries.
In addition to the share of government and foreign ownership we include the EBRD
banking reform index. To the best of our knowledge, this comprehensive index of the
regulatory and supervisory framework has not been used in empirical research before,
but related evidence in Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006) suggests that o¢cial supervisory
power correlates negatively with credit to GDP. Since structural characteristics of the
banking system, captured by the EBRD index, are separately accounted for through use
of government ownership variables, we expect a negative coe¢cient on the EBRD banking
reform index.
According to Cottarelli et al (2003) capital in‡ows had not been a major determinant
of the credit boom in Eastern European countries up to 2002. Since then however, some of
9these countries may have experienced an increase in capital in‡ows which could have come
to fuel the credit boom in some of our sample countries. To account for capital in‡ows
received by the domestic banking system we include the foreign exchange reserves held at
the central bank, scaled by GDP.9 Last, banking crises are accounted for, by including a
dummy that takes value one in crisis inception years and the following two years,10 with
a negative e¤ect expected on credit to GDP.
The analysis uses quarterly data covering the ten countries listed in Appendix 1 over
the period 1995-2005; as set out above, the sample is chosen such that it comprises all
countries that were part of the former Eastern European bloc and that now are members
of the European Union.11 During the sample period, seven of these countries reformed
their payment systems, with two countries (Poland and Czech Republic) having completed
payment system reforms before the start of the sample period and one country (Romania)
embarking on major reforms only at the very end of the sample.12 These countries are
included to achieve greater e¢ciency in the measurement of the e¤ect of control variables.
Appendix 2 contains the list of variables used and the corresponding sources.
Summary statistics for all variables used in our tests are reported in Table 1. The
descriptive statistics reported in the …rst panel con…rm an increase in …nancial interme-
diation over the sample period accompanied by a decline in the currency over demand
deposits ratio and a small increase in the excess reserves over total deposits ratio.13 The
second panel reports a correlation matrix for a number of control variables. The cor-
relation is high among some of these variables. Our approach is therefore to check the
robustness of our results to the inclusion of alternative sets of control variables.
We go on to investigate the determinants of the trend in …nancial intermediation by
estimating equation (2). The main results are reported in Table 2. The speci…cations
shown include control variables lagged by two periods14 (i.e. half a year), in addition to
the full set of country …xed e¤ects, country-speci…c trends, year e¤ects and seasonal e¤ects.
9We also experimented with a broader measure of in‡ows including foreign direct investment, portfolio
‡ows and debt liabilities. This variable tended not to be signi…cant.
10Banking crises are identi…ed using the Caprio-Klingebiel World Bank dataset (2003) at
www1.worldbank.org/…nance/html/database_sfd.html. According to this source, banking crises
ocourred in the following countries (with crisis inception years in brackets): Bulgaria (1996), Latvia
(1995), Poland (1993), Lithuania (1994).
11Bulgaria and Romania joined the European Union in 2007. All other sample countries joined in 2004.
Slovenia has – in 2007 – also joined the euro.
12The series used are not available for a su¢ciently long period prior to reform in Poland and the Czech
Republic (notably quarterly GDP).
13Credit to the private sector includes credit in both domestic and foreign currency. Payments tech-
nology may a¤ect the use of domestic currency transactions accounts by residents. The monitoring of
these accounts can in‡uence the decision to grant credit, independent of the denomination of the debt.
Moreover, while changes in domestic currency payments technology may at the margin favour domestic
credit over foreign currency credit, for lack of data we are unable to explore whether payment system
reforms might have brought about changes in the currency composition of the credit extended.
14We will later test the robustness of our results to alternative numbers of lags.
10The model has a very good …t with a within R-squared at 0.89. The coe¢cient on the
trend break variable is statistically signi…cant at the 5 percent level. It is also economically
sizable; the size of the coe¢cient suggests that the growth in …nancial intermediation
accelerates by around 4 percentage points per annum post transition to modern payment
systems, which is an economically sizable e¤ect. Moreover, all control variables have
expected signs.
In line with prior evidence we …nd the e¤ect of in‡ation to be non-linear, while overall
economic activity has a robust positive e¤ect. We also …nd evidence that …scal consoli-
dation leads private credit to expand.
Interestingly, the EBRD banking reform index is assigned a negative coe¢cient, sug-
gesting that better compliance with supervisory standards puts a break on credit creation,
as might have been expected.
In line with the result reported in Detragiache et al (2006) for high-income countries,
we …nd there to be no signi…cant e¤ect of foreign ownership on credit.15 However, we
…nd a robustly positive relationship between public ownership and credit, in line with the
evidence reported in Bertrand, Schoar and Thesmar (2007) and consistent with the idea
that public ownership results in soft budget constraints on banking …rms.
Finally, as one would expect there is a positive and signi…cant relationship between
capital ‡ows into the banking system (measured by changes in foreign exchange reserves
over GDP) and the credit over GDP ratio.
Overall, while macro factors (including in‡ation, capital in‡ows, and GDP) are shown
to play an important role, this evidence suggests that privatization and increases in for-
eign ownership are unlikely to have been an important contributor to increases in credit
observed in a number of countries over the sample period. Likewise, the overhaul of the
regulatory and supervisory framework appears to have had the e¤ect of slowing rather
than accelerating credit growth. Instead, our results single out reform of payment systems
as the key ingredient within the overall reform process that led to increases in credit in
some of the sample countries.
In Table 3 we present variations of the benchmark speci…cation that were conducted
to examine the robustness of our …ndings across sub samples and lag lengths. Column (1)
shows a regression where the sample is restricted to those countries that experienced a
payment system reform during the sample period (i.e. excluding Czech Republic, Poland
and Romania), with the results virtually unchanged.
While in our preferred speci…cation, control variables are lagged by two quarters (half
a year), in columns (2) and (3) we report models that employ a di¤erent lag length
(four and zero quarters, respectively) for the controls. In both these speci…cations, while
the R-squared remains high and the measured e¤ect on the post reform trend remains
15The share of foreign ownership remains insigni…cant when the share of public ownership is omitted
from the equation. This implies that the insigni…cant e¤ect is not accounted for by a multicollinearity
problem (high correlation) between these two variables.
11signi…cant, some of the coe¢cients on the control variables lose signi…cance. This suggests
that the e¤ects of the control variables are not immediate but take some time to work
themselves through, and that at the same time there is relatively limited autocorrelation
in the control variables.
Column (4) reports a control experiment. We assigned the average date of reform to
the three countries (Poland, Romania and the Czech Republic) that did not undertake
a reform over the sample period and checked whether evidence of a credit acceleration
around the average reform time emerges for non-reform countries. The result con…rms
that the accelerations in …nancial intermediation in the reform countries do not re‡ect a
global trend in the region.
4.2 Cross-Sectional Approach
The analysis thus far has relied on identi…cation through di¤erences in the timing of
reform, with the reform being treated as a zero-one event. As an alternative strategy
we use two continuous measures of payment system development: (1) the number of
credit transfers per inhabitant; (2) the number of all non-cash payments per inhabitant
(including direct debits and cheques). The idea is that the number of credit transfers (and
to some extent all non-cash payments) directly re‡ect the system’s use.16 Yearly data are
reported in the ECB Blue book for the period 1996-2001 for all countries in our sample
except Bulgaria. Descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 show a huge variability in the
use of non-cash payment instruments across countries which, in our sample, is unlikely
to be attributable fully to variations in levels of economic development or culture. For
instance, the number of credit transfers per inhabitant in 1996 is 30 in the Czech Republic
and 4 in Hungary.
To capture the variation in the measures of payment systems development is mostly in
the cross-section, we use an ordinary least squares estimator including year …xed e¤ects
but excluding country …xed e¤ects to identify the e¤ect of payment systems development
on credit.
Our speci…cation controls for real income per capita and the full set of determinants
of …nancial development used before (all lagged one year) and as listed in Table 2. The
estimation results reported in Table 4 con…rm our previous conclusions. An increase
in the number of credit transfers (non-cash payments) is associated with a statistically
signi…cant increase in credit. This e¤ect is again economically signi…cant. A one standard
deviation increase in the number of credit transfers per inhabitant is associated with 6.4
percentage points rise in the annual credit to GDP ratio.
16Credit transfers are e¤ected directly through the main interbank payment systems, while direct debits
and cheques are …rst netted in ancillary systems before …nal settlement occurs in the main system.
124.3 Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence Approach
To complement the evidence presented thus far we return to the payments reform model
and extend speci…cation (5) to a di¤erence-in-di¤erence speci…cation that allows the size
of the credit acceleration to be higher for countries that have less-developed payment
systems prior to the time of reform. As set out in Section 2 and described in Appendix 1 in
Estonia and the Slovak Republic (henceforth "upgraders") reforms represented upgrades
of already existing automated systems to higher operation standards for settlement risk,
security and e¢ciency. In contrast other countries like Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and
Slovenia (henceforth "reformers") experienced a one-time switch from paper-based to
automated RTGS systems. We exploit the resulting disparities in our identi…cation of
the causal e¤ect of payment systems reform on credit by interacting the reform trend
break with indicators of payment systems use in the period preceding the reform in each
country. The e¤ect of payment systems reforms on credit should be bigger where the
reform represents a bigger technological advance.














where  is the pre-reform number of credit transfers per inhabitants. The mean of
 is 12 pre inhabitant for the group of reformers and 27 per inhabitant for the group of
upgraders.
In Table 5 column (1) we report the results from this augmented speci…cation that
conditions the size of the trend break on . We …nd that the credit acceleration is larger
in countries that had less-developed payment systems immediately prior to the payment
systems reform. The di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimate in column 1 implies that post-reform
upgraders experience a credit acceleration on average 3 percentage points per year higher
than reformers.
We …nally subject this …nding to a set of robustness exercises, as follows. In column
(2) we restrict the sample to countries who introduced modern payment systems during
our sample period, excluding countries that reformed earlier than 1995 or later than 2005.
In columns (3) and (4) we run similar regressions but control for potential mean reversion
by including the trend break interacted with the pre-reform credit over GDP ratio. The
point estimates remain of comparable magnitude and statistically signi…cant across these
exercises.
5 Transmission Channels
We highlighted two channels through which a payment systems reform might a¤ect credit
creation. These are: a shift in the desired holdings of cash relative to demand deposits (on
the part of customers) and a reduction in the desired holdings of excess reserves relative
13to total deposits (on the part of banks). In an attempt to determine which, if any of these
channels might be related to our …nding of an increased growth of credit post reform, we
explore whether payment system reforms also induce trend breaks in these series. To this
end, speci…cations analogous to equation (2) are estimated, as before including country-
…xed e¤ects, year e¤ects and country-speci…c time trends. Control variables are based on















Currency is the money in circulation (domestic currency notes and coins). Total
deposits include both demand deposits and term deposits.18
As regards the demand for currency,  includes variables that capture the oppor-
tunity cost – the nominal interest rate – of holding currency and the "bad behavior"
motives for holding currency. The latter are proxied by the ratio of government taxes
over GDP,19capturing incentives for the development of black-market activities and tax
avoidance. The log real GDP per capita is also included as measuring the transaction
motives for holding currency.
As regards the demand for excess reserves,  includes variables that control for the
opportunity cost of holding excess reserves (namely the nominal interest rate), the reserve
requirement ratio and output growth.20 We also include the foreign reserves over GDP
ratio in the excess reserves equation. If the central bank sterilizes fully the increase in
domestic currency brought about by in‡ows of foreign currency, commercial banks reserves
should be unrelated to variations in the in‡ow of foreign currency. Otherwise, one might
expect to observe an increase in reserves.
We report both …xed e¤ects and seemingly unrelated least squares (SURE) estimates
of the two equations (4) and (5) in Table 6. SURE extends ordinary least squares analysis
to estimate a system of linear equations with correlated error terms, which gives more
e¢cient point estimates. For both equations we obtain a reasonable overall …t, with the
more e¢cient SURE estimator giving more signi…cant point estimates.
For equation (4) we …nd a statistically signi…cant negative post-transition trend break
17We use speci…cations similar to Drehmann, Goodhart and Krueger (2002) and Rogo¤ (1998) for
the money demand equation, and Agenor, Aizenman and Ho¤maister (2004) for the demand for excess
reserves equation.
18Both "demand deposits" and "term deposits" may include foreign currency deposits.
19This is in practice proxied by government consumption expenditures over GDP because for most
countries the tax to GDP ratio is not available at a quarterly frequency for the sample period.
20We also used the ratio of demand to saving deposits ratio but did not obtain robust results for the
e¤ect of this variable. We therefore dropped it from our analysis.
14in the currency ratio.21 The reduction is 1.5 percentage points per quarter i.e. 6 percentage
points per annum, and thus similar in magnitude to the estimated reduced-form e¤ect
of payment systems reform on credit. Moreover all control variables have the expected
sign and most of them are statistically signi…cant. Plausibly, lower economic development,
higher taxes, and lower nominal interest rates increase the use of cash relative to deposits.
For equation (5), we …nd that excess reserves are negatively related to output growth
and, plausibly, negatively related also with the ratio of required reserves. In addition, the
coe¢cient on foreign exchange reserves over GDP is not signi…cant at conventional levels,
indicating that central banks sterilize foreign in‡ows fully.22 However no signi…cant trend
break is detected upon introduction of an e¢cient payment system.23 One explanation
for this …nding is that banks’ desire to ensure against end-of-day payment shocks is only
one determinant of their desired level of reserves. A determinant which may be more
important is a bank’s management of liquidity over a longer horizon. This prudential
motivation to hold liquid assets may dominate in our sample.24
We …nally turn to a di¤erence-in-di¤erence exercise, the idea being once again that
the e¤ect of reform should be stronger where payment system reform represents a bigger
technological advance.
The di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimates are reported in columns (5) and (6). We …nd
that the decline in the currency ratio is larger in countries that have less developed
payment systems immediately prior to reform. The post-reform decline in the currency
ratio is about 1.14 percentage points per quarter higher in the reforming countries than
in the upgrading countries. For the reserves ratio by contrast, the estimates are still not
statistically signi…cant. Finally, in columns (7) and (8) we obtain similar results if we
control for the initial levels of the dependent variables. Here interestingly, we …nd that
where the initial level of excess reserves was particularly high payment systems reform
has some e¤ect in reducing these levels.
Overall, this evidence suggests that payment systems reforms are associated with
a statistically signi…cant and sizable reduction in currency relative to demand deposits
(deposit channel). By contrast there is little if any evidence of a reduction in excess
21This estimate may be taken as a lower bound as the introduction of an e¢cient payment system is
expected to trigger a decline in dollarization.
22A number of countries in our sample operate a currency board.
23We …nd the explanatory power of the reserve equation to be lower than that of the cash equation
suggesting that the high time-series variation in reserves holding is relatively hard to account for with
the available explanatory variables.
24Another reason might have been that central banks did not take steps to drain excess reserves. If
demand for excess reserves had fallen as a result of payment system reform, but central banks did not
take action to drain the excess then there is no way for the excess to be reduced, since reserves will
need to stay within the banking system. And while a reduction in demand would tend to drive down
overnight interest rates to close to the deposit rate o¤ered by the central bank some central banks might
have preferred this outcome to the draining of reserves, e.g. through issuing central bank bills, since this
is costly for central banks.
15reserve holdings (reserves channel).
6 Structural Model
To investigate further the relative importance of the deposits and reserves channels, we
assess the structural relationship between all three variables – credit, currency and excess
reserves. The idea is as follows: for a trend reduction in the currency ratio to have
caused the trend increase in …nancial intermediation, it needs to be true more generally
that liquidity shocks away from currency result in an increase in credit. Likewise, for a
reduction in excess reserves (if any) to have caused the increase in …nancial intermediation,
it must be true more generally that shifts in the demand for excess reserves are associated
with shifts in credit supply. We therefore examine the relationship between shocks to the
supply of credit and (innovation-driven) shocks to the demand for outside money (both
currency and excess reserves), as follows:
b 

 = 51 + 52b 

 + 5 + 5 + 5 (6)








are the predicted residuals from regressions (11) and (12) estimated
by seemingly unrelated least squares (SURE):





 = 41 + 

42 + 4 + 4 + 

 (8)
 is either the excess reserves over total deposits ratio or the currency over demand
deposits ratio. Speci…cation (6) allows us to explore a relationship between (innovation-
driven) shocks to the demand for outside money, re‡ected in b 
 and b 
 and unexplained
variations in the level of …nancial intermediation. The …xed-e¤ect estimate of the struc-
tural parameter 52 is consistent after removing the e¤ects of control variables common
to equations (7) and (8).
Table 7, columns (1) and (2), reports the results of estimating equation (6) using a
…xed e¤ects estimator. The point estimates con…rm that liquidity preference shocks away
from cash and towards bank deposits cause positive credit supply variations that are
both statistically and economically signi…cant. By contrast, we do not …nd a relationship
between shocks to the demand for excess reserves and credit. One reason could be that
excess reserves are noisy relative to both deposits and credit extended by banks which
makes it harder to pick up a relationship empirically. Another reason is that the demand
for excess reserves plays a minor role in determining banks’ lending behavior.
16To account for potential reverse causality between shocks to credit and shocks to cur-
rency and reserves, we employ an alternative, instrumental variables (IV) estimator, using
lagged innovations as instruments for contemporaneous innovations. Our identi…cation
assumption is that while there is a reasonable autocorrelation in b 






 is immediate to short-lagged25. In this case, b 

¡2 and b 

¡3 are valid (excluded)
instruments for b 

. Table 7, columns (3) and (4), reports the IV estimates along with
weak instrumentation and overidenti…cation tests which con…rm the validity of our in-
struments. We …nd the e¤ect of shocks to the currency ratio strengthened26, while shocks
to the reserves ratio have no e¤ect on credit, as before.
Overall, the structural estimates con…rm that payment system reforms could plausibly
have had a causal e¤ect on credit creation, through increasing the demand for deposits,
relative to cash. The structural analysis also con…rms that a reserves channel will not
have been an important causal driver of the e¤ect of payment systems reforms on credit.
The latter …nding may shed light on the ongoing debate on the mechanisms that
underlie the ’bank lending channel’ of monetary policy. The traditional view is that
monetary policy can a¤ect the amount of reserves held by the banking system and that
this in turn can, through a money multiplier, a¤ect the supply of credit to the economy
(Bernanke and Blinder (1988)). A more recent paper by Diamond and Rajan (2006)
argued that this cannot be the mechanism at work when banks in modern monetary
economies in fact hold only very small, if any reserves with the central bank. We …nd
that even in economies where excess reserves holdings are still relatively sizable (7% in our
sample), variations in excess reserves have no discernible e¤ect on the amount of credit
intermediated in the economy.
7 Conclusion
Previous studies pointed out …scal consolidations and structural reforms as drivers of the
credit boom observed in Eastern Europe (see e.g. Cottarelli et al (2003)). This paper
emphasizes that the adoption of well-functioning payment systems was an important
precondition for the observed acceleration of credit.
Our results serve to illustrate a simple but fundamental point: the banking system’s
function as provider of credit to the economy builds on its capacity to o¤er a reliable pay-
ment medium. This means that reforms to improve the e¢ciency of interbank payment
systems can have a …rst-order e¤ect on the amount of credit provided by the banking
system. We investigate two channels. First, payment system reform increases the at-
tractiveness of making payments via bank deposits relative to the use of cash (deposit
25In other words, we assume that the supply of credit by banks adjusts to variations in retail deposits
within two quarters.
26Presumably, measurement error biases ordinary least squares estimates downwards.
17channel). Second, reforms to interbank payment systems enable banks to economize on
their holdings of excess reserves (reserves channel).
Overall, we …nd strong evidence that the …rst of these channels is at work. We …nd
payment systems reforms to be associated with a trend increase in credit. We also …nd
that payment systems reforms decrease the amount of cash used in the economy, relative
to bank deposits. Moreover, further evidence suggests that these two …ndings are unlikely
to be coincidental: negative shocks to the currency ratio result more generally in an
increase in credit. As regards the reserves channel, we …nd less compelling evidence. We
do not …nd payment systems reforms to be associated with a reduction in excess reserves.
Moreover, we do not …nd that changes in the excess reserves ratio results more generally
in changes in credit.
Taken together, these …ndings may have broader implications for our understanding of
…nancial intermediation, highlighting the nexus between the role of banks in the provision
of payment services and their role in the creation of credit. By contrast, our …ndings
shed doubt on the relevance of central bank reserves in determining the amount of credit
extended by banks, questioning traditional accounts of the "bank lending channel" of
monetary policy.
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Figure 3. EBRD Banking Reform Index
21Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 






Dependent variables  Mean  Std. 
Quarterly Credit over Quarterly GDP 1.099 0.587 0.565 0.894 quarterly 432
Annual Credit over Annual GDP† 0.264 0.165 yearly 53
Currency over demand deposits 0.744 0.366 -0.376 0.322 quarterly 432
Excess reserves over total deposits  0.07 0.09 0.029 0.058 quarterly 432
Independent variables
Inflation rate 3.462 19.94 -3.116 3.455 quarterly 424
Government consumption 
expenditure/GDP 0.184 0.041 -0.025 0.042 quarterly 432
Banking reform index 1.165 0.142 0.277 0.14 yearly 117
Log real GDP per capita  9.441 2.346 0.513 0.235 quarterly 428
Nominal interest rate  13.45 21.96 -20.14 15 quarterly 400
Output growth  2.064 11.185 -0.831 2.751 quarterly 424
Public Banks' Assets Share 25.06 22.72 -41.45 22.91 yearly 117
Foreign Banks' Assets Share 53.52 29.97 56.475 31 yearly 109
Foreign Exchange Reserves/GDP 1.161 9.178 0.036* 0.085* quarterly 432
Reserve requirement ratio 8.58 5.45 -3.456 3.702 yearly 432
Min Max
Credit Transfers per Inhabitants†† 15.96 13.97 1 67 yearly 48
All Non-Cash Payments per Inhabitants†† 21.5 17.76 1 90 yearly 52
† excludes Bulgaria












Banking reform index -0.17 1
Public Banks' Assets Share 0.13 -0.68 1
Foreign Banks' Assets Share -0.12 0.57 -0.73 1
Foreign Exchange Reserves/GDP 0.03 -0.37 0.21 -0.16 1
Difference 1995-2005Table 2. The Effect of Payment Systems Reform on Credit - Post-Reform Trend Breaks 
The dependent variable in all three panels is the Credit/GDP ratio
(1) (2) (3)
Post-Reform Trend Break 0.055** 0.040** 0.042**
(0.019) (0.015) (0.016)
Inflation  0.006* 0.005* 0.005*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Inflation*(High Inflation dummy) -0.005** -0.004* -0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
High Inflation dummy 0.038** 0.026 0.026
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Expenditure over GDP ratio  -1.137* -1.294** -1.294**
(0.612) (0.544) (0.496)
Log real GDP per capita  0.867* 0.768* 0.779*
(0.409) (0.379) (0.359)
Banking reform index  -0.687 -0.712*
(0.391) (0.387)
Banking crises -0.132 0.035
(0.138) (0.069)
Public Banks' Assets Share 0.006* 0.006* 0.005*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Foreign Banks' Assets Share 0.0004 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Foreign Exchange reserves/GDP  0.01*** 0.01***
(0.001) (0.002)
Country specific trends  x x x
Year fixed effects x x x
Country fixed effects x x x
Seasonal Dummies x x x
Within R-squared 0.86 0.88 0.89
Nbr. obser.  404 400 400
Note: Robust clustered  (at the country level) standard errors in parentheses. 
Significant at (*) 10 per cent level; (**) 5 per cent level; (***) 1 per cent level. Table 3. The Effect of Payment Systems Reform of Credit; Robustness to Lag-Length, Sub-Sample Variations and Control Experiment
The dependent variable in all three panels is the Credit/GDP ratio




four lags on 
control 
variables No Lag 
Control Experiment: 
Trend break for non-
Adopters at the average 
reform date
Post-Reform Trend Break 0.038** 0.049** 0.040* -0.010
(0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.011)
Inflation  0.006** 0.0002 0.002 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008)
Inflation*(High Inflation dummy) -0.005* -0.0005 -0.00005 0.0003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009)
High Inflation dummy 0.030 -0.002 -0.015 -0.086
(0.019) (0.02) (0.032) (0.055)
Expenditure over GDP ratio  -0.998 0.140 -1.364** -1.632
(0.740) (0.520) (0.578) (1.111)
Log real GDP per capita  1.258*** -0.048 0.085 0.488*
(0.203) (0.164) (0.183) (0.169)
Banking reform index  -0.791* -0.566** -0.821 -0.137
(0.354) (0.248) (0.663) (0.357)
Banking crises 0.087 0.067 0.159 -0.101
(0.076) (0.073) (0.107) (0.112)
Public Banks' Assets Share 0.006 0.003 0.007* 0.007
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Foreign Banks' Assets Share -0.0007 -0.002 -0.0001 -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Foreign Exchange reserves/GDP  0.009*** 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.595
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.495)
Country specific trends  x x x x
Year effects x x x x
Country effects x x x x
Seasonal Dummies x x x x
Within R-squared 0.89 0.88 0.85 0.97
Nbr. obser.  288 380 420 112
Note: Robust clustered  standard errors in parentheses. 
Significant at (*) 10 per cent level; (**) 5 per cent level; (***) 1 per cent level. Table 4. Relationship Between Alternative Measures of Payment Systems Development and Credit
Dependent variable: Annual Credit over Annual GDP ratio
(1) (2)
Credit Transfers per Inhabitant 0.0046***
(0.0013)
All Non-Cash Payments per Inhabitant (a) 0.0022*
(0.0009)
Year Fixed effects x x
One year Lagged Control Variables (b) x x
R-squared 0.89 0.79
Nbr. obser.  35 38
Note: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
The sample includes all countries covered previously except Bulgaria. 
(a) Including direct debits and cheques. 
(**), (***) Stands for significance at 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively. 
(b) All control variables as listed in Table 2
Table 5. Difference-in-Difference Estimates 
Dependent variable: Annual Credit over Annual GDP ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
two lags excluding 
non-reform 
countries
two lags excluding 
non-reform 
countries
Post-Reform Trend Break 0.073 0.069 0.109*** 0.108***
(0.010) (0.006) (0.016) (0.012)
(Trend Break)*(Pre-reform number of 
credit transfers per inhabitant) -0.190** -0.184** -0.125*** -0.122***
(0.070) (0.069) (0.029) (0.028)
(Trend Break)*(Pre-reform average 
credit/gdp ratio) -0.048*** -0.049***
(0.008) (0.009)
Inflation  0.005 0.006** 0.004* 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Inflation*(High Inflation dummy) -0.004* -0.005** -0.003* -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
High Inflation dummy 0.024* 0.025 0.022* 0.024
(0.013) (0.020) (0.010) (0.016)
Expenditure over GDP ratio  -0.922* -0.632 -0.952 -0.708
(0.469) (0.685) (0.539) (0.809)
Log real GDP per capita  0.802** 1.294*** 0.768** 1.222***
(0.348) (0.165) (0.331) (0.164)
Banking reform index  -0.582* -0.625** -0.701* -0.741**
(0.304) (0.251) (0.321) (0.286)
Banking crises -0.017 0.018 -0.068 -0.051
(0.069) (0.081) (0.069) (0.092)
Public Banks' Assets Share 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Foreign Banks' Assets Share -0.002 -0.001 -0.0002 0.0003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Foreign Exchange reserves/GDP  0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Country specific trends  x x x x
Year effects x x x x
Country effects x x x x
Seasonal Dummies x x x x
Within R-squared 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.91
Nbr. obser.  400 288 400 288
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at (*) 10 per cent level; (**) 5 per cent level; (***) 1 per cent level. Table 6. Transmission Channels 
Currency ratio (a)
Excess Reserve 








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post-Reform Trend Break -0.015* 0.0003 -0.015*** 0.0004 -0.026*** 0.003 -0.001 0.007***
(0.007) (0.0015) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002)
(Trend Break)*(Pre-reform number of 
credit transfers per inhabitant) 0.076*** -0.015 0.097*** -0.0001
(0.025) (0.010) (0.025) (0.011)
(Trend Break)*(Pre-reform average 
currency ratio) -0.029***
(0.007)
(Trend Break)*(Pre-reform average 
excess reserves ratio) -0.085***
(0.022)
log real GDP per capita  -0.228* -0.290*** -0.277*** -0.260***
(0.112) (0.069) (0.068) (0.067)
Government expenditure over GDP ratio 0.923 0.889*** 0.778** 0.603*
(0.587) (0.318) (0.315) (0.311)
Nominal interest rate -0.003*** -0.0002 -0.003*** -0.0002 -0.002*** -0.0002* -0.002*** -0.0003**
(0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001)
Output growth  -0.0003* -0.0003* -0.0004* -0.0004**
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Reserves requirement ratio -0.009** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Foreign Exchange reserves/GDP  0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0004
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Country specific trends  x x x x x x x x
Year effects x x x x x x x x
Country effects x x x x x x x x
Seasonal Dummies x x x x x x x x
Within R-squared 0.57 0.48 0.93 0.80 0.93 0.80 0.93 0.80
Nbr. obser.  396 392 392 392 392 392 392 392
Note: Robust clustered  standard errors in parentheses. 
Significant at (*) 10 per cent level; (**) 5 per cent level; (***) 1 per cent level. 
(a) The currency ratio is the ratio of currency in circulation (oustide the banking system) over demand deposits and the reserves ratio is the ratio 
of excess reserves held by private banks over total deposists. 
(b) SURE stands for seemingly unrelated least squares 
SURE (b) SURE (b) Fixed Effects SURE (b)Table 7. Structural Model Estimates 
Dependent variable: Shock to Credit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Currency ratio shock (a) -0.414**  -1.529*** 
0.168) (0.453)
Excess reserves ratio shock (a) 0.636 0.439
(0.469) (0.300)
Anderson LR statistic Weak Instrument Test 43.37 161.05
Chi-sq(4) p-value 0.00 0.00
Hansen J statistic Overidentification Test 0.38 1.48
Chi-sq(3) p-value 0.54 0.22
Country Fixed effects x x x x
Year effects x x x x
Seasonal Dummies x x x x
Nbr. obser.  374 374 364 360
Note: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
Significant at (*) 10 per cent level; (**) 5 per cent level; (***) 1 per cent level. 
Shocks are residuals obtained after estimation of the system of equations (9) and (10) using seemingly unrelated least squares
(a) The currency ratio is the ratio of currency in circulation (oustide the banking system) over demand deposits  
and the reserves ratio is the ratio of excess reserves held by private banks over total deposists. 
(b ) We use the second and third lags of the liquidity preference shocks as instruments for contemporaneous shocks





The Bank Integrated System for Electronic tRAnsfers, BISERA (the national settlement system of Bulgaria) was 
introduced in 1992. Until the introduction of RTGS in 2002, the settlement procedure was built on a queuing facility 
and an interbank payment transaction was only carried out if the sending bank had sufficient funds on its current 
account with the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB). If sufficient funds were not available to settle the first payment in 
the queue, the queued payment remained unprocessed until such funds are received. When a payment, owing to the 
lack of liquidity of a bank, could not be executed within a period of ten working days after having been entered in 
the settlement system, the payment was rejected by the settlement system and deleted from the waiting queue. There 
was an option for some payments to be settled during the same working day directly by the BNB, on the basis of 
payment orders submitted on paper, or via SWIFT at BNB desks. This express service was organised for all 
payments addressed to or initiated by the BNB, direct bank-to-bank payments related to interbank money market 
operations, payments on the primary and secondary government securities market, and some budget payments. The 
efficient functionality of the new RTGS system, RINGS, helps assure a more efficient liquidity management of 
commercial banks, improving the efficiency and the security of the payment system, and reducing the systemic and 
credit risks in the national payment system. The efficiency of the payment system reduced the banks liquidity needs. 
As under the currency board arrangement the BNB cannot provide funding to commercial banks, a Reserve 
Guarantee Fund was set up to ensure the settlement of the netting systems with and to mitigate systemic risk.
In 1992 the central bank introduced a new interbank payment system and set up a Clearing and Settlement Centre 
to handle all domestic currency payments between banks. This made it necessary to introduce a modern, secure, 
reliable and effective interbank clearing and settlement system. In a very short time (only eleven months after the 
contract was signed) the necessary technology was installed and the software completed. On 8 March 1992, after 
fourteen months of development, implementation and testing, the live operation of the Clearing and Settlement 
System at the central bank Clearing Centre started. After the division of Czechoslovakia at the beginning of 1993, 
a new clearing centre was founded in Slovakia, while the former federal Clearing and Settlement Centre remained 
within the Czech National Bank.
Appendix 1. The Timing and Components of Payment Systems Reforms in the Ten Sample Countries, Drawing on 
Publications Issued by National Central Banks
The first interbank payment system in Estonia, EPNAS, which was owned and managed by Eesti Pank, was 
operational from 1992 until 2002. At that time EPNAS was the only interbank payment system in Estonia and was 
used for settlement of both high-value and retail payments. In 2002 Eesti Pank reformed the interbank payment 
and settlement system and it was split into two systems: RTGS and the Designated Time Net Settlement System 
(DNS). According to Eesti Pank, the final objectives of the reform were to accelerate settlements, build 
confidence in the banking sector and reduce the use of cash for high-value transactions. RTGS was needed in Hungary  1999
Latvia 1998
Lithuania 2004
(DNS). According to Eesti Pank, the final objectives of the reform were to accelerate settlements, build 
confidence in the banking sector and reduce the use of cash for high-value transactions. RTGS was needed in 
order to ensure efficient, fast and secure settlement of payments in Estonian kroons and central bank money, 
providing a controlled systemic risk environment. In addition, RTGS was needed in order conform with the 
payment systems of euro area countries and for the connection with TARGET.The implementation of the new 
system has allowed commercial banks to widen the choice of services provided to clients and it enables more 
flexible liquidity management. For bank clients, the new system primarily meant faster movement of payments 
between banks.
The launch of the new real-time gross settlement system VIBER in September 1999 is an important milestone in 
the comprehensive development of the payment systems. Implementation of VIBER is not without antecedents: it 
carries on paper-based account management services of the National Bank of Hungary. The extended opening 
hours of the large-value payment system (VIBER) have improved daily liquidity management by the banks. The 
legal framework has also been strengthened by removing the legal uncertainties that had existed regarding 
pledges, thereby mitigating the risk involved in repo contracts. This was an important step towards further 
deepening the domestic money market.
The new multilateral net settlement system, the EKS, was implemented in November 1998 as a replacement for 
the paper-based clearing system. The EKS is an automated clearing house system, which handles bulk 
payments in electronic form. The changeover from paper-based processing of payment orders to electronic 
exchange was gradual. A transition period of five months was established, during which, in parallel with the 
EKS, a limited portion of payments were processed in paper form through the manual clearing system. Since 
the end of this transitional period the Bank of Latvia has accepted only electronic payments in the clearing 
circuit. The SAMS project was a major undertaking by the Bank of Latvia to modernise the national payment 
system. The objective of the project was to build an RTGS system that will provide higher operating standards 
for settlement risk, security, efficiency and capacity in the future. SAMS became fully operational in 2000.
The payment system LITAS went live on 19 January 2004 and replaced the paper-based payment system 
TARPBANK that was operating from 1993. The payment system LITAS is fully automated and was designed to 
process payment transactions in real time and at a designated time. As from the date of its creation the 
TARPBANK system has proved to be reliable. However, the requirements for operation, capacity, speed of 




During the period in which Poland had a centrally planned economy, the system for interbank settlements was 
based on the exchange of paper documents. There was no clearing house to intermediate in the exchange of 
payment orders between banks. Settlement documents were sent between banks by post. Debiting of the current 
accounts of sending banks and crediting of the current accounts of receiving banks was not performed on the same 
day. The move towards a market economy triggered a major reform of the payment system. New, uniform 
principles for interbank settlements in zloty became effective on 5 April 1993. At first these were only binding on 
shareholders of the National Clearing House (KIR), ie on 17 banks, but, since 1 July 1994, they have applied to all 
banks operating in Poland. Since then zloty payments in Poland have been processed by two different systems: 
large-value payments by the RTGS system of Narodowy Bank Polski and retail payments in KIR. The system 
fulfils the requirements for a modern RTGS system, ie payments are processed electronically in real time on a 
gross basis and, once settled, are final and irrevocable.
During the second half of 2004 and in 2005 a significant number of goals were achieved in the payment systems 
field. A large part of the legal framework was harmonised with EU legislation and most of the former 
infrastructure was gradually replaced by a new fully automated system. Thus, in April 2005, the large-value 
payment system ReGIS was launched, replacing the previous system in which payment instruments were 
manually processed and settlement was not final until the end of the operating day. ReGIS is a real-time gross 
settlement system.
From January 2003 significant change occurred in the Slovak Interbank Payment System (SIPS) operating since 
1993. The National Bank of Slovakia became an operator and at the same time a settlement agent of SIPS, the 
only interbank payment system in the Slovak Republic. The reason for this change was an effort by the National 
Bank of Slovakia to boost the effectiveness and safety of the payment system using the state-of-the-art 
information technology as a base for building up RTGS system under the conditions of the Slovak Republic. 
The payment system in former Yugolsavia was prone to systemic risks, and disconnected from the accounts held 
by the entities at the central bank.  Paper-based credit transfers dominated the system and accounted for over 90 
% of the payments value. In 1998 the central bank implemented a new (RTGS) system SIBPS (the Slovenian 
Interbank Payment System) and a designated time multilateral net settlement system called Giro Clearing.Variables  Sources
EBRD banking reform index EBRD website
Credit over GDP ratio World Bank Fin-structure dataset online
IMF IFS Statistics 
Gross domestic product line 99b
GDP deflator  line 99bip
Government spending line 82
Overnight rate or treasury bill rate  line 60b
Population line 99z
Reserve money (currency in circulation)  line 14a
Reserves at central bank  line 20
Demand deposits  line 24
Time, saving and foreign currency 
deposits  line 25
Public Banks' Assets Share EBRD database website
Foreign Banks' Assets Share EBRD database website
Foreign exchange reserves line 1.d.d
Credit Transfers per Inhabitants ECB Blue Book  2001
All Non-Cash Payments per Inhabitants  ECB Blue Book  2001
Reserve requirements ratios
Central Banks annual reports and various other 
sources
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